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Constitutionality of Export Controls
It was not until twenty-five years ago' that the federal government
embarked upon an extensive program of export regulation. While
embargoes had been imposed intermittently since 1794,2 never before
had export control become a peacetime fixture. The basic statute, the
Export Control Act of 1949, 3 not only grants the President authority to
[I.] With the fall of France, Congress granted the President blanket authority to impose
export controls to strengthen the national defense. Army Reorganization Act of July 2,
1940, § 6, 54 Stat. 712, 714 (1940), as amended.
[2.J During the dispute with England preceding the Jay Treaty, a two month embargo
was imposed on all shipping in an effort to force Britain to come to terms. SAuELr. IiMs,
DIPLOMATIC HLSTORY OF THE UNITm STATES 100-01 (2d ed. 1942).
[3.] 63 Stat. 7 (1948), as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 2021-2032 (1964, 1965 Supp.). The





















Mutual Security Act of 1954, g 414,
68 Stat. 848 (1954), as amended, 22
U.S.C. § 1934 (1964); 22 C.F.R.
§ 121-22 (1966).
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 68
Stat. 939 (1954), as amended, 42
U.S.C. § 2139 (1964); 10 C.F.R.
§§ 36, 40.3, 40.33, 50.10, 50.44, 70.4
(1963, Supp. 1966).
Gold Reserve Act of 1934, 48 Stat.
337 (1934), 31 U.S.C. § 442 (1964);
Act of October 6, 1917, § 5(b), 40
Stat. 415 (1917), as amended, 12
U.S.C. §§ 95(a), 95(b) (1964); 31
C.F.R. § 54 (1966).
Narcotics & Drugs Import and Ex-
port Act, 38 Stat. 275 (1914), as
amended, 21 U.S.C. §§ 182-83
(1964); Int. Rev. Code of 1954,
§ 4741.
Tobacco Seed and Plant Exporta-
tion Act, 54 Stat. 231 (1940), 7
U.S.C. § 516 (1964).
Shipping Act of 1916, 39 Stat, 730
(1916), as amended, 40 Stat, 901
(1918), as amended, 46 U.S.C,
§§ 808, 835 (1964), 46 C.FR. § 221
(1966).
Natural Gas Act, 52 Stat. 822
(1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717b (1964); 18
C.F.R. § 153 (1966).
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The Post Office assists in the enforcement of all of these statutes. Local Postal officials are
instructed to check parcels in order to assure compliance. 39 C.F.R. §§ 141-45 (1966),
promulgated under authority of I Stat. 28 (1789), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 22 (1964), 74 Stat.
580, 581 (1960), 39 U.S.C. §§ 501, 505 (1964).
Export Controls
restrict exports for reasons of national security or foreign policy, but
also permits restrictions in the event of domestic shortage.4 Scarcity
at home has caused the Bureau of International Commerce, acting
for the President, to restrict the export of goods of considerable im-
portance to the world economy. During the past ten years, iron, steel,
aluminum, nickel, and sugar have been on quota for substantial
periods. Currently, the list includes copper and shoe leather.0 This
Note argues that quotas of this type, whose only justification is
domestic scarcity, violate Article 1, Section 9 of the Constitution-
"No tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any state."
Serious consideration of the constitutional status of export regula-
tion has been discouraged by reference to the embargoes maintained
from time to time since the early days of the Republic. But the embargo
precedents cannot justify quotas imposed as a tool of commercial
[4.] Export Control Act, §§ 1, 2; 63 Stat. 7 (1948), as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 2021-22
(1964, 1965 Supp.).
L5.] Export Control Act, § 4(a), 63 Stat. 8, as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. § 2024 (196
Supp.), requires the Bureau to consult with those agencies and departments concerned
with exports.
[6.] The following list of restricted items was prepared by the Bureau of International
Commerce at the request of the Yale Law Journal Oct. 10, 1966, on file in Yale Law
Library:
Iron and steel scrap
Diamond Bort
Hog Bristles
Nickel Powder;, nickel and nickel
alloy metal; nickel and nickel
bearing scrap; cobalt alloy






Copper base alloy igots
Copper scrap (new and old,
unalloyed scrap; copper base
scrap less than 5% nickel)
Copper and copper alloy scrap
Semifabricated copper products
Polio (Salk) vaccine
Rerolling, relaying, and used
steel rails
Influenza vaccine (Asian Strain)
Beet and cane sugar
Walnut logs, bolts, and hewn timber
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policy. Embargoes have been declared either during war,7 to punish
an unfriendly country by a means short of war,8 or to prevent arms
shipments from contributing to foreign instability.9 But quotas imposed
to relieve shortages, like duties on exports, are prompted by domestic
concerns.
Moreover, export quotas burden trade at least as much as duties.
So long as foreign demand remains constant, a numerical limit
on exports obviously inhibits free trade as much as a tax set so that
only an equal number will be purchased. And if foreign demand
increases, the quota will be more restrictive in that none of the new
foreign demand will be satisfied. It is for this reason that the members
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) have agreed
in principle to abolish export quotas, even though they have not
reached agreement on duties.10 GATT, however, contains a proviso
permitting export control in the name of domestic scarcity." But the
Constitution goes farther. Since the Export Clause bans taxes or duties
it would be paradoxical to suppose that it permits a technique at least
as restrictive.
To escape this construction, the Clause could be viewed merely as
prohibiting a particular form of taxation, instead of extending broad
constitutional protection to the export trade. But the records of the
Constitutional Convention reveal a larger purpose. In fact, the dele-
gates voted down an amendment which would have banned only those
export duties imposed "for the purpose of revenue.' 2 In doing so,
the Convention was aware that it was depriving the new government
of a tool for both domestic and foreign commercial policy. Some
colonial duties had been designed, in part, to funnel domestic raw
materials to domestic manufacturers.12 Furthermore, it was clear that
[7.] Embargoes have been imposed during every war fought by the United States, with
the exception of the Mexican. See BEMIS, op. cit. supra note 2, at 160 (War of 1812), 373
(Civil), 618 (World War I); ELTON ATWATER, AMERICAN REGULATION Or ARMtS ExrORTs 18
(1941) (Spanish-American War); see also note 1 supra.
[8.] Between 1794 and 1812, the United States frequently imposed embargoes on exports
to compel Britain and France to respect its rights as a neutral. ATwATER, op. cit. supra
note 7, at 11-15.
[9.] Id. at 37-38.
[10.] Oct. 30, 1947, art. XI, para. 1, 61 Stat. A3, A32.
[I1.] Oct. 30, 1947, art. XX, part II, 61 Stat. A3, A62, as amended [1957] 8 U.S.T. &
O.I.A. 1786-87.
[12.] 2 FARRAND, THE REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 363 (1937).
[13.] Duties imposed on lumber exports, for example, were largely motivated by colonial
efforts to encourage the ship building industry. See ALBERT GiEsEcFE, AMERICAN CoM-
AERCIAL LEGISLATION BEFORE 1789 49-53 (1910). Duties were also commonly levied on raw
hides to encourage the establishment of tanneries. Id. at 43. The export of iron ore was
occasionally taxed for the sake of domestic foundries. See, e.g., 2 JEREAtv BELRNAP, HISRstY
oF NEw HzwipsmRR 29 (1791) (available in the Beinecke Rare Book Library). Maryland
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a stiff tax on exports would have helped persuade England to open
West Indian ports to American shipping.14 Still, the delegates refused
to accept the proposed limitation on the Clause. They also rejected
a second amendment, which permitted export taxes if approved by a
two-thirds majority in both Houses. 15 In leaving the Export Clause
intact, the Convention reached a deliberate decision to prohibit the
government from burdening the export trade in any way.
Today, it may seem careless of delegates to have mentioned only
"taxes" and "duties," ignoring other burdens on exports. But no
other type of regulation was used by the states during the fifty years
preceding the Convention. During the seventeenth century the colonies
had sporadically imposed total embargoes for commercial reasons, but
by the eighteenth century this technique had been abandoned;10 nor
was the administration of a system of export quotas within the bureau-
cratic talents of our forebears.17 Thus, by 1789, the chief restrictive
devices used by the states were export and tonnage duties,18 and the
Convention removed these obstacles in the Export Clause. The only
other type of export restriction which the delegates had experienced
was the English Navigation Acts. These acts took a variety of forms, but
in essence they required the colonists to ship their exports of certain
"Enumerated Commodities" through England where a tax was imposed
before the goods could be transshipped to their European purchasers.10
The Constitutional provision immediately following the Export
Clause prevents the federal government from granting one section
intermittently imposed pig iron ore duties during the period of Confederation. 1 Jotisso.
VAN MuERE, HUEBNER &- HANcHErr, HisroRy OF DOMEsnc AND FOREiGN COmMERCM OF THE
UNrrnD STATEs 140 (1915). Maryland and Virginia imposed revenue duties on tobacco at the
time of the Convention. Ibid. For a more detailed account of the tobacco tax, we GirsacxE,
op. cit. supra, at 45-49.
[14.] VEmON SmER, THE Co.stERcAL Rcnnocm' PoLIcy OF Tim UNrrU STA'-s 1174-
1829 100 (1937).
[15.] 2 FARRAD, op. cit. supra note 12, at 363.
[16.] GiESECKFE op. cit. supra note 13, at 80-82. Mr. Giesecke claims that Ne= Hampshire
imposed an embargo upon iron ore in 1719 to aid an iron works. A search of contemporary
sources indicates, however, that the state only levied duty of ten pounds on each ton
exported. See 2 BELKNAP, op. cit. supra note 13, at 29.
[17.] A leading historian describes the colonial customs service:
Collectors were constantly charged with a great v-ariety of misdemeanors-illegal
trading, connivance at illegal trade, compounding breaches of the law, accepting brides
and excessive fees and handing in imperfect and even erroneous accounts-but accusa-
tions, true and false, and offenses, great and small, were to be expected in connection
with so large a body of men, often untrained, ignorant, and mediocre, underpaid and
overworked, and engaged in carrying out, within districts that were generally too
large for any one man to cover, an unpopular code of commercial law ....
4 CHARLES ANDREws, TiE COLONIAL PERIOD or Amwc:AN HIsToRy 203 (1938).
[18.] A tonnage duty is a tax varying with the capacity of the ship. For a discussion of
early tonnage duties see generally, GmsxcrE, op. cit. supra note 13, at 86-99.
[19.] The system is explained in 4 ANDREWS, op. cit. sura note 17, at 85-107, 424.
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of the country a comparable position in the export trade by forbidding
favoritism of one port over another. The delegates prohibited the
threat to exports as it presented itself in the concrete, not in the
abstract. They barred duties without considering that other restrictive
techniques could flourish in a more regulated society.
If, however, the Convention had foreseen the possibility of more
sophisticated restrictions, it would have outlawed them as well, for
the aims of the Clause would have been frustrated by quotas as much
as by duties. The Export Clause gave the South one of the guarantees
it demanded before it would enter the union. Thanks to its prohibi-
tion, foreign trade in cotton, rice and tobacco would be insulated from
the control of the new government. The economic sources of Southern
power would remain secure.20 If the federal government had been free
to impose export quotas depriving suppliers of lucrative foreign mar-
kets, and forcing them to ship to the North at lower prices, Southern
autonomy would have been severely compromised and the Export
Clause nullified.
Though Southern demands made the Export Clause a political neces-
sity, the Convention intended it to do more than protect the interests
of one region. It recognized that "every state might reason with regard
to its particular productions, in the same manner as the Southern
States. The Middle States may apprehend an oppression of their wheat
flour provisions, etc. and with more reason, as these articles were ex-
posed to a competition in foreign markets not incident to tobacco,
rice, etc." 21 Northern states, 22 as well as Southern ones, voted against
the attempts to weaken the Clause.
Finally, the Clause expressed the free trade policies generally fol-
lowed by the national government during the period of Revolution
and Confederation.m The Model Treaty, adopted by the Continental
Congress in 1776 to serve not only as a proposal to France, but as a
declaration of principle, offered French citizens all the commercial
privileges of Americans, if France would reciprocate.24 When in
120.] CHARLEs WARREN, THE MAKINo OF ME CONMSTUTION 571-74 (1947).
[21.] 2 FARRAND, op. cit. supra note 12, at 363.
[22.] On the motion to limit the prohibition to duties levied for the purposes of
revenue, New Hampshire, Massachusetts and Connecticut voted to keep the Clause intact.
Of the northern states, only Connecticut voted against the motion to permit duties with
the consent of two-thirds of Congress. 2 FARRAND, Op. cit. suPra note 12, at 363.
[23.] For the impact of free trade philosophy on newly independent America, see FEUX
GILBERT, To Tm FARmwr.L ADDRESS 42-43, 54-69 (1961).
[24.] Id. at 54-56. The French rejected the offer and insisted on a conditional most
favored nations clause. See Setser, Did Americans Originate the Conditional Most
Favored Nations Clause? 5 J. or MODERN HIsToRY 319 (1933).
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1784, the Confederation embarked on an effort to negotiate commercial
treaties with the European powers, the principles of the Model Treaty
were reaffirmed.2
The Export Clause should serve similar functions today-protecting
domestic producers and advancing free trade. Export quotas, like ex-
port duties, can be used for the benefit of manufacturers at the expense
of primary producers. The transfer occurs without the use of the highly
visible taxing power, and without any need to grant a controversial
subsidy. Furthermore, quotas provide the easiest way of retreating
from the goal of freer trade. When an increased import tariff is pro-
posed, the interest of a large class of consumers is clearly threatened.
At the very least, a politician would make a sober appraisal of the
proposal before supporting protection. Not so with an export quota.
Its effect on consumers is invisible and roundabout. As a quota in-
creases supply available on the domestic market, at least temporarily,
the consumer gains in the short run. The risk of reprisal and the gen-
eral principle of comparative advantage may often remain in the back-
ground. Thus the Clause can serve its historic purpose by foreclosing
modem restrictions on the export trade.
Even if the contemporary importance of the Export Clause is
granted, remembrance of things past may prompt suggestions that
the Court should avoid all intervention in the formulation of national
economic policy. But a casual reference to the Old Court and the New
Deal does not dispose of the problem. For the Export Clause does not
invite the Court to explore the vague contours of the due process clause
or the penumbras of the Fourth Amendment, nor to second-guess
the "reasonableness" of legislation. Rather, its mandate resembles
that of the Commerce Clause, which the Court has used to protect
free trade among the states without arousing cries of judicial usurpa-
tion.26 The Export Clause can be invoked to the same effect.
[25.] GImERT, op. cit. supra note 23, at 70. This campaign also was a failure. Ssnun,
op. cit. supra note 14, at 74-81.
[26.] Under the Commerce Clause cases, the states are generally prohibited from
burdening interstate more than domestic commerce. While a state may impose an income
tax upon an interstate business, it must apply it non.discriminatorily, and only upon the
income earned within the state. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota,
358 U.S. 450 (1959). In a limited number of situations, a state has been permitted to
discriminate against out-of-state interests on the ground that the state had a property
interest in the resource protected. McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1877). But this argu-
ment has had little success in twentieth century decisions. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia,
262 U.S. 553 (1923); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
For general discussions of the area see, Hartman, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce:
A Survey and an Appraisal, 46 VA. I. REv. 1051 (1960); Barrett, State Taxation of Inter.
state Commerce--"Direct Burdens," "Multiple Burdens," or What Have You? 4 VAD. L
Rxv. 496 (1951).
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Even in the limited area of export control, judicial intervention will
not totally disable the government. In extremis, the government
could offer to buy substantial quantities of the product from domestic
producers at a price exceeding the world market price. Of course, this
would require a greater expenditure of political, as well as economic,
capital. The greater cost, however, will encourage a more intensive
scrutiny of export regulation with an eye to the matter of principle at
stake. Thus, in invoking the Export Clause the Court would be per-
forming the educational function for which it is ideally suited.
In declaring certain quotas unconstitutional, the Court would not
be constructing constitutional principles out of whole cloth. Rather,
it would follow the course of Export Clause adjudication. In Fairbank
v. United States,27 the Court invalidated a stamp tax which levied ten
cents on each export bill of lading, recognizing that if a nominal tax
were justified, a more considerable burden could constitutionally be
placed on exports. Reaching the basic principles at stake, the Court
denied that the Clause merely prohibited levies designed to raise reve-
nue or those aimed at the exports of one region. Rather, Fairbank held
that "the requirement of the Constitution is that exports should be
free from any governmental burden."28 Nor was the Court impressed
by the fact the tax was imposed on the bill of lading and was not levied
on the export directly. In its view, "The form in which the burden is
imposed cannot vary the substance." 2
Fourteen years later, the Supreme Court reaffirmed Fairbank in
companion decisions. It struck down both a tax on policies insuring
against the risks of foreign shipping 0 and a tax on foreign charter
parties.8' Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Hughes used a rationale
which outlaws quotas as surely as it does all forms of montetary burden:
This constitutional freedom, however, plainly involves more than
mere exemption from taxes or duties which are laid specifically upon
the goods themselves. If it meant no more than that, the obstructions
to exportation which it was the [Clause's] purpose to prevent could
readily be set up by legislation nominally conforming to the constitu-
tional restriction but in effect overriding it.82
[27. 181 U.S. 283 (1901).
[28.] Id. at 290.
[29.] Id. at 295.
[30.] Thames g: Mersey Marine Ins. Co. v. United States, 237 U.S. 19 (1915).
[31.] United States v. Hvoslef, 237 U.S. 1 (1915).
[32.] Id. at 13. The more recent decisions have considered problems not relevant to the
constitutional status of export quotas. A. G. Spalding & Bros. v. Edwards, 262 U.S. 66
(1923), held a sale to a broker, buying on behalf of a foreign customer, was an "export"
and could not be taxed. See also Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 829 U.S.
69 (1946). William E. Peck & Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 165 (1918), refused to permit an exporter
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Though existing quotas are unconstitutional, it may be possible to
validate future restrictions by use of the treaty power. Whether a
treaty can override specific constitutional restrictions remains unclear.
While Supreme Court dicta may be found insisting that the Constitu-
tion's "thou shalt nots" may in no event be overridden, 3 Missouri v.
Hollands4 indicates that at least some provisions can be. In Holland
the Court assumed that a federal statute regulating the hunting of
migratory birds would be unconstitutional, but nevertheless upheld
such a statute enforcing a Migratory Bird Treaty negotiated with
Canada. Central to the Court's reasoning, however, was the fact that
the treaty did "not contravene any prohibitory words to be found in the
Constitution. The only question is whether it is forbidden by some
invisible radiation from the general terms of the Tenth Amendment."a
Consequently Holland cannot stand as a direct precedent supporting
a treaty whose provisions contravened the Export Clause. Indeed,
Holland's continuing vitality seems questionable. It may well be that
Justice Holmes resorted to an expansive conception of the treaty power
as the only way to save a federal statute whose constitutionality was
doubtful given the prevailing insistence on states' rights. With the
demise of Tenth Amendment jurisprudence an appeal to the treaty
power would no longer be necessary to save the birds.
But still, the treaty power may justify some export quotas, particu-
larly since some treaties may actually further the policies behind the
Export Clause. For example, multinational efforts to stabilize world
commodity prices would neither frustrate the goal of world economic
development nor impoverish commodity producers. Indeed, the long
term interests of primary producers may well be served by export
restrictions imposed in the name of income stabilization. It is clear
that though the Convention did intend to proscribe all burdens on
to use the Export Clause to avoid the reach of the Internal Revenue Service. The court
held that a general, non-discriminatory income tax was only an "indirect" burden upon
exports. Id. at 175. See also Canton R.R. v. Rogan, 340 U.S. 511 (1951), Western Mar)land
Ry. v. Rogan, 340 US. 520 (1951); Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minntaot,
358 U.S. 450 (1959).
P3.] The treaty power, as expressed in the Constitution, is in terms unlimited except
by those restraints which are found in that instrument against the action of the
government or of its departments, and those arising from the nature of the government
itself and of that of the states. It would not be contended that it extends so far as to
authorize what the Constitution forbids, or a change in the character of the goern-
ment or in that of one of the states, or a cession of any portion of the territory of the
latter without its consent.
Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890) (Field, J.). (Emphasis added.) See Reid v. Covert,
354 U.S. 1, 6 (1957). But ef. Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524 (1957). See generally, Sutherland,
Restricting the Treaty Power, 65 HLv. L. REv. 1305, 1312-20 (1952).
P4.1 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
[5.] Id. at 433-34.
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exports, it did not imagine that short term limitations could further
the long term development of international trade.
Obviously, the Court lacks the competence necessary to determine
whether a given arrangement aids or inhibits trade in the long run.
Nor is the spectre of searching judicial review likely to facilitate
international negotiation. Consequently, the Court should only strike
down blatant attempts to avoid the Export Clause through the use of
the treaty form.36 It should, however, insist that the agreement in
question is in fact a treaty, approved by two-thirds of the Senate,
and not a unilateral executive decision.
It may also be that a limited range of statutory export controls would
not contravene the policies of the Clause. Where the government im-
poses a burden on the domestic trade in a product it should be per-
mitted to impose an equal burden on its international trade. Here
it would be unreasonable to assume that the law is discriminating
against exports. A ban on foreign trade in heroin is not imposed to
force producers to sell more cheaply at home.
Finally, controls initiated to further military and foreign policy
objectives may be defended in their own right. The Constitutional
Convention recognized the distinction between political and commer-
cial regulation and meant to ban only the latter. When Madison and
Morris, speaking against the Clause, claimed that it prohibited all
embargoes,37 its defenders corrected him immediately, insisting that
actions justified by the war power lay beyond the Clause's scope. 8
In recent decades most theorists have recognized an independent
"foreign affairs power," 39 derived from the exigencies of America's
position in the world as well as from the enumerated powers over war
and foreign commerce. Actions justified by the foreign affairs power
should not be exposed to an Export Clause challenge. Judicial review
of an embargo, such as that currently imposed on trade with "inde.
pendent" Southern Rhodesia,40 would compel the Court to assume
the role of chief diplomat-a position for which the "Judiciary has
neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility." 41
[36.3 A requirement that the treaty be signed by nations purchasing at least five per
cent of the export controlled would eliminate blatant frauds on the Treaty Power.
[37.] 2 FARRAND, op. cit. supra note 12, at 360-61.
[88.] Id. at 361-62.
[89.] See MCDOUGAL & ASSoCrATEs, STUDIES IN WoRLD PUBLIC ORDER, 404-718 (1960),
[40. On March 18, 1966, the Department of Commerce imposed export controls on all
exports to Southern Rhodesia and announced it would permit only those shipments which
were necessary for essential humanitarian or educational projects. 75 DEP'r or COMMERc E
QUARTERLY REP. ON ExPORT CONTROLS 28 (1966).
[41.] Chicago & Southern Airlines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 83 U.S. 103, 111 (1948).
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Where none of these rationales apply-as they do not in the case of
quotas imposed to ameliorate domestic scarcity-export limitations
should be struck down. Othenvise, the mere fact that restrictions
have taken forms unforeseen in 1787 would suspend the operation of
a constitutional provision whose policies are as relevant today as they
were when it was first adopted.
See Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 YMX
L.J. 517, 573-83 (1966).
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